Crannogs and binoculars hang from the head of the mule … | Part III | July 18-May 8 2012

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July 18 (p 207)

This is the second email from O’Keeffe to J White in Document 29. O’Keeffe admits that he has not visited the site in person, but that Gormley did on the previous day and had reported ‘significant progress by the archaeologists on site, and that the main excavation works are nearly complete’. However, there may be a ‘need for a few extra days to complete the excavation, but we are taking here of days rather than weeks or months.’ This quoted section appears to have been underlined in pen on the printed version. White’s response, if any, is not available in this archive.

 

I appeared on the BBC’s Good Morning Ulster show to discuss the site. No transcript of the encounter survives.

 

July 19

Hurl interrogated the site crew to discover who had spoken to me. One of the several whistle-blowers admitted to providing photographs that proved the exceptional richness and preservation of the site and was summarily dismissed. Even a decade later, I still feel angry about the shameful treatment of this whistle-blower and my regret that I was unable to protect them.

 

A mere two extra days were given to complete the crannog excavation, but with a site crew reduced to four.

 

July 23

The Cherrymount Crannog Crisis Facebook group was launched to act as a focus for discussion and newsgathering etc. [here].

 

Cooney notes that O’Keeffe briefed the minister with the following statements: ‘1. NIEA has monitored the progress of the excavation as it has progressed and is content with how the site has been excavated and recorded’ and ‘4. All occupation levels have been excavated and fully recorded’. O’Keeffe attempted to walk these statements back on December 14 by adding a handwritten note to the file (see below).

 

July 26

BBC NI website publish a post on the site [here]. The post contains a quote from Seamus Keenan claiming that the location of the crannog had not been known in advance: ‘If we had known the crannog was in the area at the early stages we would have done everything we could to avoid it. In this case, we are dealing with an area which is a water logged bog essentially. It was only late in the day that we realised that the crannog was right there in the road line.’ Subsequent updates to the story removed this falsehood [see here].

 

O’Keeffe visits the site and is moved to wait until December 14 to add a handwritten note to the NIEA file to indicate that his overly rosy briefing to the minister was not based on first hand knowledge, but what he had been told by Gormley, who remained on-site to ensure that the excavation was progressing appropriately. Of that July 26 visitation he says: ‘From my own inspection of the site on 26/7/12 it was evident that the excavation to that date was not complete, not satisfactory and not of the standard required’.

 

July 27

Cooney notes a pivotal meeting, minutes of which do not appear in the current archive. This was to be NIEA, Roads Service et al., and a number of key stakeholders. Cooney states that one of the outcomes was ‘that a Senior Environmental Archaeologist should be employed immediately to devise and implement a scientific, environmental archaeological sampling strategy and obtain maximum value from the excavation’ and would act as co-director with Declan Hurl.

 

July 29 (pp 209-11)

Document 30 is the ‘Licence to excavated for Archaeological Purposes’, issued to Hurl with a cover letter from Foley. It is to cover the period from July 30, 2012, to January 29, 2013. The signature of the Authorised Officer is redacted.

 

July 30 (p 32, 212)

Email from J Knight (Amey) to S McKinney (Amey) forwarding the ‘green dot’ email from November 29, 2010. On that date McKinney forwarded the same to S Keenan. The email appears to have been printed out at this point and highlighter marker applied to two sections, thus: ‘The overlay on the 1st ed map shows that the location of the crannog seems to be beneath the proposed road. On the modern vector maps there appears to be a circular enclosure marked (that may indicate the crannog) at roughly the same location as the crannog on the 1st ed map. The green dot on the overlay shows the location of the crannog as noted in our SMR …’

 

On this date, Minister Attwood (SDLP) visited the crannog, declaring a ‘No-go zone’ around the site until it could be properly excavated.

 

July 31 (p 217)

The last paragraph of D McKinley’s email to J White notes a meeting that involved, at least McKinley and C Foley, and wrongly dated as August 30 (Document 32, dealt with in more depth below). He described a comment by Foley as ‘very striking and pertinent’ in relation to the apparent failure to identify the exact location of the crannog when she noted that on the 1833 OS map the crannog was at the intersection of three Townland boundaries, and that where such boundaries meet on a body of water, they frequently converge on an island, either natural or human made. The implication here is that the intersection of three Townland boundaries in a former lake where they were looking for a crannog should have been raised as strong indicator. He adds that ‘I accept this totally and this would have given us a lead as to where to look in the first instance and I tend to believe that had we known (or thought) of this at the early stages of scheme development, the Cherrymount alignment would be some 40 metres further to the east. Lesson learnt? – talk directly to those who have most knowledge in respect of any particular possible/suspected archaeological feature.’ Quite apart from the fact that there was at least one further previously unknown crannog in the lake and moving the line of the road might have created other issues, ‘those who have most knowledge’ should have been the various archaeologists already involved, whether directly employed by Amey or representing NIEA. Foley herself had already been in several meetings about this site (going back to at least December 2010) but does appear to have offered that insight at that time, and in any event the line of the road had long been decided. The final point I would make here is that a core proficiency of anyone offering professional advice is to be aware of their own limitations and acknowledge their lack of experience in certain fields and call for specialist support where required. Had all the archaeologists involved in this fiasco taken a moment of self-reflection and sought out the services of a wetland archaeology specialist, this mass Dunning-Kruger event might never have transpired.

 

August 7 (pp 216-7)

Document 32 is an email from D McKinley to J White that attempts to set out ‘a brief history of the management of the crannog at Cherrymount’. He brings up the old chestnuts that they were made ‘aware of a “possible” crannog’ and how they asked NIEA for assistance, but were informed that NIEA ‘had no resource to help locate it and confirmed that the onus on [sic.] the “developer”’. McKinley notes that the exact site of the crannog could not be located and that because of this they decided to pursue their preferred path across the bog. As has been stated on several occasions, the exact limits of the site may not have been known, but it was clear that the road was going to impact directly on the site. He notes how the infamous green dot ‘was approximately 10m to the east of the road embankment. He describes the test trenching of the site as ‘inconclusive owing to the high ground water infiltrating the trenches.’ Not technically wrong, but quite a few of those trenches were ‘excavated’ without archaeological supervision and it appears that no attempt was made to pump them out, clean them down and examine them in any manner that resembled an archaeological excavation. Instead, we had the much vaunted ‘tactile investigation’ of the trenches. He mentions the cracking that appeared through the crannog and that ‘NIEA agreed that … the crannog could be archaeologically excavated and recorded. The emphasis was to record the top “habitation layers” which made NIES more relaxed about the underlying “construction layers” to the extent that they were amenable to the road embankment “leaning” on the side of the residual crannog or even to the installation of a few discrete piles to support the pending overburden.’ He outlines Hurl’s plant to have 12 archaeologists dig it all out in six weeks and that ‘The excavation/recording proceeded to plan and on the 7th week an archaeologist on site made representations to an independent archaeologist presumably on back of their disagreement with the management of the dig which resulted in “blogs” being published on the world wide web.’ It is worth pointing out (yet again) that the July 17 blog post was the result of several archaeologists, each with many years of experience, coming to me independently to relay their concerns that the excavation was due to be concluded and the site declared ‘finished’ while much more, well-preserved portions of the site remained – not some jumble of putative ‘construction layers’, but evidence of hearths, structures, artefacts, etc. McKinley continues that ‘As a result of outside interest, NIEA sought comment from other independents and experts in the field of crannogs to get the archaeological fraternity to accept such opinion and the proposed way forward.’ Wow … so much to unpack here … first of all, it’s only at the point of this utter omnishambles being brought to public light does NIEA suddenly think that it’s a good idea to ask actual experts in … you know … actual crannogs … what they might think! Why didn’t someone think of this back in 2006? If they had, this whole fiasco would have been avoided! The other thing of note here is that McKinley, at least, appears to be of the opinion that the point of engaging experts on crannogs was to get them to back the flawed mitigation strategy, thus defusing any public controversy. As this appears to be an email intended for internal Roads Service & Amey readership, it is unclear how prevalent this apparent plan to deploy wetland specialists to endorse the proposed mitigation was and if it was in any way shared by representatives of NIEA. However, even at this point NIEA were arguing that ‘they needed another week to complete the work on site which was perhaps manageable in terms of keeping the contractor on board and costs. [sic.]’ He notes Minister Attwood’s intervention & declaration of the ‘no go area’ on July 30 (mistakenly giving it as August 30), saying that the action was ‘on back of whatever advise [sic.] he had received and directed that all construction work/site traffic stop in the vicinity of the crannog and co-opted a Ms Nora Birmingham [recte. Bermingham] to act as “Co-Director” to the archaeology dig. McKinley describes her as ‘an “environmental archaeologist” specialising in identification of seeds etc arising from the dig’ … I don’t know if this description is meant to be insulting, but I think that if I identified individuals within Roads Service as ‘knowing a bit about tarmac’ there’s be audible outraged pearl clutching. He continues: ‘Curiously, NIEA have worked closely with Amey’s senior archaeologist (Declan Hurl) have now decreed that he was not sufficiently experience [sic.] to direct the dig some 8 weeks after introductions and the dig ongoing but are content that Mr Hurl and Ms Birmingham [sic.] together have sufficient knowledge/experience.’ You won’t often hear me say that I feel for Roads Service, but here I really do – Hurl had been attached to this project from at least (judging by the correspondence available in this archive) February 2009 and NIEA have clearly been happy with the situation. However, as soon as they are forced to revaluate their position under the gaze of wide-ranging public and professional scrutiny, it was clear that, despite many years of excavation experience, Hurl simply did not have the relevant wetland knowledge. To be fair, it’s a very small group of people who do have that specialised skillset. I would liken it to a group of medical doctors … yes, they’re all Dr’s, but one specialises in setting and rebuilding broken bones while another is a skilled brain surgeon. However skilled the brain surgeon may be, if I rock up to A&E with a fractured femur, I know which of the pair of them I want to see! As I say, I can see road Service’s frustration - NIEA (through the licencing process) are meant to have oversight of, among other things, professional competence and did nothing to raise flags or sound warnings. The nuance, of course, is that for the majority of this time, the options involved light test trenching and some hypothetical means of preserving the crannog in situ. One could argue that the December 13, 2010, meeting between Foley and Hurl (discussing the first test trenching) was the time to advise that a wetland specialist was contracted to direct the excavation. However, it was certainly time to make this call at the April 25, 2012, meeting (to discuss the cracks and the fact that the northern portion of the crannog has fallen off) between Gormley and the representatives of Amey, Roads Service, etc. He goes on to say that Bermingham recommends a further eight weeks with 20 archaeologists, but that Hurl is still arguing that only 4-5 weeks are necessary. In an interesting insight into archaeological costs, he mentions that the 12 archaeologists on site were being billed at £7,000 per week, for seven weeks and that the additional eight weeks with 20 archaeologists will be billed at c. £100,000. But all of this pales into insignificance in the face of the potential penalty costs from the contractor of £45,000 per week for standing idle. On top of this ‘RS could face a claim for materials in respect of increased imported fill and a disposal of site material rendered unsuitable by wet weather working.’ He imagines a ‘worst case scenario … well in excess of £500k’. The last section of this email I feel the need to deal with is McKinley’s statement ‘Co-operation between DRD and NIEA has been very positive throughout and the resolution of the crannog was/is a good news story unfortunately marred by actions with the archaeological fraternity.’ To quote the line often attributed to Mandy Rice-Davies: "He would say that, wouldn't he?" Roads Service and their agents clearly had a very cordial relationship with NIEA representatives, who offered relatively little pushback on resolution methodologies. Suddenly one blogger (acting on the genuine concerns of several well-placed and highly experienced archaeologists on site – already expressed to both Hurl and NIEA and all dismissed) had exposed the inadequacies of the excavation strategy, placing it firmly in the view of international interest. Of course, Roads Service would be upset. But all that needs to be asked is this – ‘Which of these opinions won out?’ … did the excavation continue as planned or was there a shift in leadership to someone with extensive wetland archaeology experience who directed a modern, scientific investigation, the results of which will provide insights for years to come? I can wait all day …

 

September 5 (p 222-3)

The second part of Document 33 (pp 222-3) is an email chain covering the period from September 5 to 7. It is unclear if this was originally sent as an appendix or attachment to the first part of the document (dealt with below). On September 5 S Keenan emailed P Doherty & D Knight. He outlines how the Phase II excavation (with N Bermingham as co-director) is in its fifth week and that at the weekly review meeting held the previous day Gormley & Bermingham indicated that the excavation would require a further 3-4 weeks.

 

Later the same day Doherty replies to Keenan & Knight to describe the developments as ‘Disappointing news’, asks for an indication of the costs to the contractor would be as well as suggesting they discuss it with O’Keeffe. He ends with the observation that ‘We need some certainty re completion of the archy [sic.] work and no more surprises.’ I get it! I really do … all Roads Service wanted to do was build a road with no hindrances … and yet, after being entangled in this clusterduck (largely of their own making), they’re still hoping for ‘no more surprises.’ I cannot claim insight into how contemporary the working environment of Roads Service is, but forward-looking business in the private sector seek out and cultivate leaders with the ability to deal with what is termed VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, & Ambiguity). Frankly, a person in senior position in any organisation who – after living through a fiasco of this magnitude – that’s still wishing for ‘no more surprises’ should probably take a good, hard look at themselves.

 

September 6 (p 222)

McKinley (cc’d on previous email) informs Doherty that ‘I’ll ring John’, presumably O’Keeffe.

 

September 7 (p 222)

Email from McKinley to White & Doherty. He relates how he spoke with O’Keeffe. The latter indicated that ‘the prospect of completing the “dig” in a few days/weeks is slipping away.’ O’Keeffe estimates that a further 10 weeks may be required, pushing the end date into mid-November. McKinley is clearly frustrated with this news and asks ‘how the additional 8 week period originally indicated by Nora Birmingham [sic.] could more than double. O’Keeffe’s response is that the excavation team have ‘found further habitation layers which need to be recorded although they are content that they mow know where the bottom of the habitation layer is.’ Understandably, McKinley is not concerned with the archaeology per se, but that this news ‘puts RS in a very vulnerable position in relation to contractor claims.’ He closes with the note that O’Keeffe intends to visit the site again on Monday (September 10) and that the two will speak again then.

 

September 10

Based on the detail in McKinley’s email in Document 33, O’Keeffe was due to visit the excavation. A summary is presented by O’Keeffe in the September 14 email.

 

September 14 (p 220, 225-6)

Document 35 is a short email trail, beginning with O’Keeffe to McKinley. He notes the meeting earlier in the week and how they had ‘particular discussion about how long the archaeological works were likely to continue for, and how we might be able to speed up the archaeological resolution of the site.’ He clearly sets out that the original estimate for the eight-week excavation with a crew of 20 was based on two assumptions. The first was ‘that a crew … would be brought on site from the week commencing 6 August 2012’ and ‘that the deposits uncovered at that time were representative of the archaeological remains that had to be investigated.’ That would have led to an end date of September 28. However, they were unable to get an experienced crew of this size together at short notice and, while they worked in most weathers, they still lost some time to inclement conditions that lead to flooding of the site. While these are marginal setbacks, the real issue is that ‘it is evident to me that the site continues to reveal more complex elements and more remains than previously recognised before the change in approach was adopted at the start of August.’ He argues that as the archaeologists have become more familiar with the site and its intricacies their speed of excavation has increased. The other element that he observes is ‘how some logistical elements of site management and archaeological investigation can be brought forward to help speed up the resolution of the site, and I have communicated this to Dr Bermingham, who is putting this in place with the assistance of your contractors on site.’ So, here we have a story that has been predicated on a theme of senior leaders with no real experience of wetland archaeology thinking that they were able to devise or dictate the means of successful resolution. And what do we see here? O’Keeffe, a man of many talents, not one of which is the excavation of complex wetland excavations, dictating points of site management and archaeological technique to one of the most experienced and respected professionals in the field. Perhaps it wasn’t quite as awful in reality as it reads on the page, but it hardly seems to stand as a beacon of leadership best practice. Taking everything into consideration, he believes that a date in mid to late November might be achievable. It’s worth noting that the word ‘might’ is both in italics and underlined and he plainly states that he ‘must also caution against an ‘optimism bias’’. He says that he intends to inspect the site in the week following and that he is due to meet with Minister Attwood about another site and intends to bring Drumclay up at that point too. Regarding the finds and sampling strategy, O’Keeffe notes C Moore as the on-site wood specialist, C McSparron having inspected the recovered pottery, and T Young would be visiting to give specialist advice on the metal artefacts as well as the best approach for sampling metalwork debris. He has also arranged for 2-3 archaeologists from QUB to be on site to take part in the excavations. He thanks Roads Service for their ‘help and understanding … in trying to resolve the archaeological works required.’ He continues that ‘This is a situation that we all had sought to avoid at the outset of the project, but now have to deal with, and I want to achieve this as professionally and efficiently as possible.’ He ends with a confirmation that they will meet the following Thursday (September 20), but that he is prepared to meet and discuss the site at any time.

 

 

(p 224)

Document 34 is titled ‘Early Warning/Confirmation of Change’ and is presented on Amey headed paper. It is dated September 14 but appears to refer to events up to a month-and-a-half previously, including Minister Attwood’s intervention, Bermingham’s right to approval of archaeological CVs (the 20 archaeologists for 8 weeks is specifically noted, as is the requirement to work longer days). The daily rate, overall cost of the archaeology, as well as the signature of the Project Manager are all redacted.

 

September 17 (p 225)

Second email in the chain from O’Keeffe’s email of September 14 (Document 35). Here McKinley forwards the previous to White and Doherty. The last line reads: ‘Looking forward and in short, completion in the 3rd week in October might be achievable, else it could prolong to 23rd November.’

 

September nd., but post September 14 (pp 218-21)

Document 33 is a report on Roads Service headed paper from G Allister (Chief Executive, Roads Service) to D Kennedy, MLA, titled Archaeological resolution of a Crannog, A32 Cherrymount Link Road, Enniskillen.’ It covers most of the points in the same way as Document 32, which may have been a partial source for this report, along with the email chain from September 5 to 7. In particular, it reiterates that Hurl had argued that a team of 12 archaeologists could resolve the site in six weeks and that a request for a further week was made towards the end of the excavation. The report notes that ‘At the same time, an on-site archaeological digger made representations to an independent archaeologist, Mr Chappell [sic.] expressing concern that the crannog excavation was being carried out in perceived haste. Mr Chappell [still sic.] made representations to the local media on the matter and the story was covered by BBC Radio Ulster and BBC Newsline.’ I’ve said it multiple times & I’ll say it again – though RS, Amey, NIEA were not to know, I had been approached by several archaeologists, not just one, all of whom had expressed their deep concerns. None of these concerns were that the excavation ‘was being carried out in perceived haste’, but that the time allotted was insufficient to properly excavate the site. It also probably deserves to be repeated that, while I am proud of my involvement in this case, I did not act alone – it was not just my voice being raised that effected change! I would also note that, beyond publishing the blog post (itself the words of another), I made no ‘representations’ to anyone – they all came to me! The following paragraph goes on to state that as a presumed result of all this media and professional attention, Minister Attwood visited the site on July 30. The significant detail that is noted here is that ‘He had on that morning appointed Ms Nora Bermingham, a private archaeological consultant to act as “Co-Director” to the archaeological dig’. This is of the utmost importance as it indicates that the move to engage an acknowledged expert in wetland archaeology came only in the period after the publication of the blog post and not, say, around the time of the cracking and the destruction of the northern portion of the site; not when Hurl put forward his excavation strategy, and not when it was clear to experienced archaeologists on the ground that Hurl’s additional seventh week of excavation would be insufficient to resolve the site. Only after legitimate concerns were made public and caught the attention of both archaeologists and the wider public was a specialist in the area contracted. The remainder of the report covers the issues of cost and length of time required to resolve the site. He notes Bermingham’s initial outline of 20 archaeologists for eight weeks (end: September 28) and that Roads Service had, belatedly waking up to the issue, insisted on weekly progress meetings. At the third of these meetings Gormley and Bermingham are reported as having suggested that ‘a few extra days’ beyond the expected end date would be required. However, at the following week’s meeting it was announced that a full 3-4 weeks would be needed (end: October 19-26). It gets worse. O’Keeffe’s letter of September 14 suggests that the excavation would need to continue into mid/late November. He estimates that the cost of the archaeology will amount to approximately £300,000, but that the real money is the contractor’s intention to seek ‘additional cost for standing time and other indirect costs.’ Roads Service expected that this would run to £50,000 per week, or £1,150,000 for the length of the 23 week axcavation.

 

September 28 (or soon after) (pp 230-3)

Document 37 is the ‘Summary Results of Phase 2 Excavations (August 6^th-September 28^th 2012)’ by N Bermingham. The report includes sections on Chronology, Crannog construction, Buildings, Artefacts, Environmental Data, & Conclusions. As these address the archaeological findings, rather than the planning and administrative failures on site, I will make no comment, save for noting that her last line calls for ‘A comprehensive and well-resourced post-excavation programme … to ensure the excavation record is transformed into a well-understood and accessible dataset and to allow the results to be brought forward to publication.’

 

October nd.

Publication of ‘Cherrymount Crannog, Fermanagh’ by myself in Archaeology Ireland Magazine [here]

Publication of ‘Nothing of any significance was unearthed’ in British Archaeology magazine [here]

 

October 12 (p 234)

Document 38 is titled ‘Early Warning/Confirmation of Change’ and is presented on Amey headed paper. It notes that ‘Instructions received from Nora Birmingham [sic.] and approved by NIEA to extend the excavation until the end of March 2013 to enable the full detailed excavation of the Drumclay crannog.’ In part B the unredacted costs are given as £112,000 for the 8-week excavation and that this increased to £168,000 with the addition of a further 12 weeks. This additional extension will raise archaeological costs to £224,000. The signature of the Project Manager is redacted.

 

October 23 (pp 227-9)

Document 36 is the minutes of the Roads Service mandated weekly progress report. McKinley & Keenan represented Roads Service; McKinney and W McKay for Amey; O’Keeffe, & Gormley from NIEA, and Moore being the sole representative of the actual excavation team. It is reported that the team have removed c.3.8m of deposits and uncovered the remains of two houses, but that bad weather, resulting in flooding of the site, resulted in the loss of seven days. It suggested that the end date of the excavation be pushed out to November 30, & O’Keeffe will formally request the extension from Minister Attwood. While the site was at capacity in terms of the numbers of archaeologists who could physically be present on the crannog, they could benefit from having a dedicated draftsperson as part of the team. O’Keeffe is to approach the Centre for Archaeological Fieldwork (CAF) at QUB to provide a draftsperson. Addressing post-excavation costs, O’Keeffe estimates that it will require a budget of approximately £250,000 and take four years to complete. While such work would normally rest with the developer (Roads Service), it is suggested that it be taken on by DoE as a research project, but he warned that they were at an early stage, as excavation was still ongoing. Worryingly, the minutes note that McKinney was ‘to investigate where the archive for the investigations undertaken in January 2011 is, as it needs to be associated with the main excavation archive.’ They bring up the pivotal article in British Archaeology magazine with McKinley asking for an official rebuttal ‘of the several inaccuracies listed’ on behalf of DRD and DoE. It is noted that Hurl, though not at the meeting, ‘has drafted a rebuttal from his point of view.’ Both McKinney and McKinley were particularly keen to address the supposed inaccuracies of both the British Archaeology article and one by myself in Archaeology Ireland magazine. While Minister Attwood had given permission for a rebuttal to the Archaeology Ireland paper, O’Keeffe noted that this would be delayed as the Minister wanted to announce his decision to have an investigation into the debacle. O’Keeffe also had concerns over ‘the danger of two varying replies issuing. He suggested a possible joint general press statement rather than specific article responses’. The final point they raise is that The Institute of Archaeologists of Ireland (IAI) are holding their conference in Belfast, and the first paper to be presented will be about the crannog. Get this! It’ll be ‘given by people that have not been directly connected with the project.’ What could they possibly know about anything? And who could this dreaded bunch be? Well, that’d be M Seaver, J O’Dowd, and my good self, your humble narrator! It should be noted that while it is recorded that Roads Service insisted on weekly progress meetings, this is the only set of minutes in the archive.

 

October 31 (pp 235-7)

Document 39 is a colour printout of three pages. These are the Home page of the NI SMR, the previously mentioned article in British Archaeology, and the NI SMR page for the Drumclay crannog. The printer appears to have included the web URL and the date printed.  

 

November 2

Institute of Archaeologists of Ireland (IAI) conference in Belfast. Paper ‘Drumclay, Cherrymount, a crannog in crisis’ presented by M Seaver, J O’Dowd, & R M Chapple. [here]

 

December 14

O’Keeffe added a handwritten note to the NIEA file to walk back statements he had previously given to the minister, namely that: ‘1. NIEA has monitored the progress of the excavation as it has progressed and is content with how the site has been excavated and recorded’ and ‘4. All occupation levels have been excavated and fully recorded’. His note reads: I wrote this prior to my own inspection of the site, based on information to hand at the time. Para 12, sentences 1 and 4 are not correct, though this is what I understood at the time. From my own inspection of the site on 26/7/12 it was evident that the excavation to that date was not complete, not satisfactory and not of the standard required’. Cooney’s report does not make it clear whether or not O’Keeffe moved to inform the minister of this misinformation. If this information was inaccurate, it could have come from only one source – NIEA Senior Inspector, M Gormley – who had been specifically directed to assess the conduct of the excavation.

 

2013

February 16

NIEA organised a Crannog Open Day to show the site to the interested public [here]. Ahead of being bussed from Enniskillen Museum to the site, the attendedees were treated to a presentation on the current state of knowledge around crannogs generally and those of Fermanagh in particular and how the current excavation was of international importance. However, NIEA presented the planning history of the site in such a manner that one would have never known that a public protest occurred or was even necessary. Instead, the listener was treated to a rose-tinted version in which NIEA were the heroes of the day, deserving all credit and honour. It sickened me as much that day as it does today.

 

March 20 (pp 238-40)

Document 40 is a copy of a Roads Service report titled Update on the Archaeological Investigation at Cherrymount Link Road, Enniskillen. The document is sent by J White to Danny Kennedy, MLA (UUP). He mentions a submission from G Allister (now an executive Advisor to Amey, but then Executive Director of the Highways Term Maintenance Association) (not preserved in this archive), as well as an Assembly Question tabled by Tom Elliott (UUP), asking for the cost per week of the excavation. He notes that Minister Attwood had agreed for his department to fund the excavation and that while NIEA had originally suggested a completion date of March 31, it had been moved to April 9, and then to April 15. White goes on to state that the contractor has insisted that the site be made available by early April, so that the road can be competed ahead of the G8 summit (June 17-18, 2013). I’ve never understood what the obsession with the G8 summit and that the road absolutely, positively had to be completed by that date, but have heard it trotted out by several speakers within Roads Service and NIEA with no further elaboration as to why. They were aware that there were other roads, right? Perhaps there was a geographical imperative that dictated that eight world leaders and their entourages simply had to use the new section of road, or some Cthulhu-like monster would rise from the depths to exact a terrifying price? Until I know better, we’re going with The Cthulhu Hypothesis – thank you Roads Service for saving us all! In the final section White reminds Kennedy that he has already discussed this matter with his subordinates and that he has said he’s happy with the April 15 Deadline, just so long as NIEA are paying the bills. He also recommends that Kennedy write to Attwood, using the draft letter he has kindly supplied.

 

March 23 (p 242)

Typed letter on DRD headed paper from Kennedy to Attwood, presumably the letter prepared for him by White (above). In it Kennedy agrees to the extension of the excavation until April 15, but reiterates that ‘It is imperative this timeframe is strictly adhered to, as the Link Road must be completed and open to traffic prior to the G8 summit in June.’ Once again, no explanation is given as to why this piece of road is so important to the G8. Perhaps the opening, like some event in a Hellboy comic, will stifle the plans of the Ogdru Jahad, preventing Ragnarok, the end of the world.

 

April 4 (p 241)

Letter on DoE headed paper from Attwood to Kennedy acknowledging receipt of March 23 [sic.] letter. He says that he has ‘advised officials, the lead archaeologist and others of your decision’ and that he will provide a report ahead of the April 15 deadline.

 

April 15 (pp 243-7)

Document 42 is a transcript of an interview I did with Conor Bradford’s Good Morning Ulster show on BBC Radio. I gave several interviews on both radio & TV, but this is the only one preserved in the archive. Bradford asks me about why the site is of importance and why it needed to be excavated, rather than preserved in situ. I argued that the site was of international importance and that the road wasn’t nearly as vital as Danny Kennedy claimed it was. As I’m attempting to hold forth on the importance of the site, I’m cut off by Bradford who mentions the G8 and how that this section of road is needed for this event. My reply is: ‘I think this is a spurious argument. There is no suggestion that if this one little section of road is not completed on time that the G8 leaders are not coming here. I think this is an absolutely ridiculous argument and that anybody has believed it so far is ridiculous to me.' Damn it, but I really can put a sentence together when I need to, can’t I? Bradford goes on to ask what can be done in the face of this final deadline, suggesting on site protests or a sit in. After saying that I would be against such measures, Bradford notes that ‘There was a statement from Danny Kennedy, he says he hopes the flexibility and understanding shown on his part will be welcomed by those seeking to finish the excavation work but he must stress that there can be no further extensions.’ This is where the transcript ends, but I seem to remember muttering something like ‘nonsense’ and Bradford, with a wry look, inquiring: ‘So, you don’t agree?’ According to the heading on the transcript this brief interview happened at 07:46 – that could have been the beginning or the end of it, but I certainly remember being back at my desk before 09:00. D Morris, the typist, got to work in earnest as it was sent from the EIS Typists email address at 11:12. I would quibble that I’m referred to throughout as ‘Robert Chapel’, but these people couldn’t consistently spell Dr Nora Bermingham’s name, and she worked for them! I would have hoped that they would have gotten the name of the site right and not have referred to it as ‘the Drumclegg crannog’, but it’s not likely to be confused with any other ongoing crannog excavation in Fermanagh at that time. At 11:27 a T Irons forwarded the transcript to the DRD Press Office. Within one minute the Press Office forwarded it to several people, including an E FlynnDavies, who waited until 14:03 to forward it to S Keenan with the note ‘Here’s the crannog script. From this morning.’ Keenan didn’t wait around, and at 14:05 forwarded it to, among others, McKinley and Doherty with the note ‘For info/sk’.

 

May 8 (pp 248-9)

Document 48 is a letter, on Historic Monuments Council headed paper from Cooney to Keenan. He sets out the terms of the investigation he has been asked to complete by Attwood. He notes that ‘The Review has already obtained a substantial amount of information from NIEA and Roads Service files to which it has been given access.’ And invites him as one of ‘those individuals who participated in the events to provide a statement in writing, should they wish to do so.’ He asks Keenan not to exceed 1,000 words and have such a response returned by May 24. Although this is the only example of this letter from Cooney in the archive, it is clear that he wrote to at least one other person (McKinley) as the two issued a joint response on May 23 (see below). He finishes with the note that should the statements raise further questions he will invite the individuals to be interviewed in person. I would point out that no one involved in the external advocacy for the site was afforded such an opportunity to put their side across for inclusion in the official account of the fiasco. This includes myself and those experienced archaeologists on site who initially brough this matter to my attention.