Crannogs and binoculars hang from the head of the mule … | Part II | January 2011-July 17 2012
2011
January 10 – 25 (pp 81-99) Trial Excavation
Document 16 is the report on the licenced test
excavation/trial trenching of the crannog. It was issued in February 2011 but
was carried out from January 10 to 25. In the Field Survey portion Hurl
describes the crannog: ‘Using Fredengren’s (2002, 79-81) criteria, the crannog
can be classified as a low, even, roughly circular mound with a gradually
sloping edge and without discernible edging material’. My own reading of
Fredengren is that ‘low’ mounds have a height of 0.5 – 2m above its
surroundings. She also makes the point that her system ‘is mainly a method of
describing the sites as they appear in the field, [not] what they looked like
when in use’ (ibid.). The section on mitigation (4.1) states the agreed
purpose of the trial trenching: ‘to give an insight into:
the
date of construction;
the
date(s) of occupation horizons; and
the
complexity and sensitivity of archaeological remains’
Section 5: Results describes in top-down order the
excavated features within the 3 x 3m trench. The salient points are that it was
located in the apparent centre of the site, so no understanding of the form of
the edges and potential slope of the site beneath the bog cover could be gained
(as Foley had originally recommended). Similarly, due to the water level within
the bog, excavation below 600mm was limited to ‘a few sondages’. One of these
produced ‘a fine rectangular sheet of worked wood’. The pottery included 72
sherds from a single Everted Rim ware vessel along with other coarse pottery
types. Three struck flints (one being a burnt thumbnail scraper) were
recovered, along with a corroder piece of iron (probably a nail), and the
aforementioned wooden sheet. The summary, once again, states that the crannog
is ‘on the line of the proposed alignment … The site will be directly impacted
by the proposed link road.’ In interpreting the archaeological features, Hurl
discusses the ‘only discernible occupation feature … [was] a rough hearth,
composed of a small bank [4, 5], a stone setting [7] and an ash and charcoal
spread [6] in the NE corner’. He interprets ‘the underlying organic and clay
layers recorded in the trench [as being] associated with the construction of
the crannog. Based on the evidence Hurl quite rightly concludes that the site
was constructed and occupied during the Late Medieval period. And therein lies
the problem – not just the incompleteness of the evidence, but the failure of
critical thinking about the nature of the excavated evidence. As given above,
the excavation sought to provide dating of both the construction of the site as
well as any occupation horizons, along with providing an assessment of the
somewhat more nebulous ‘complexity and sensitivity of archaeological remains’.
Even the newest recruit to the world of archaeology is aware that the only way
to know the earliest activity is to get down to the lowest layer – that’s how
stratigraphy works! Clearly, this did not happen. Hurl dug down to the first
layer of timbers and stopped. I realise that he was constrained by the water
level, but small, reliable, and immensely portable pumps are easily available –
why was one not used? I would go so far as to say that a 3 x 3 x 0.6m trench
was never going to answer any of the important research questions posed, but
why did so many experienced archaeologists think that it would? The report ends
with the proposed piling solution (discussed in greater depth below),
indicating that no further excavation was thought necessary. It should be noted
that Document 16 lists Appendices B-C (site plans, Site Photographs, and
Artefact photographs) that are not included in the PDF. Appendix A (Maps) is
included and along with the location maps that one would expect, is (two
copies) of Fig. 5. The ‘schematic of proposed engineering solution’ drawn by
Hurl and discussed in greater depth in the February 3 email, below.
January 17 (pp 75-8)
Document 13 is a set of meeting minutes prepared by D Hurl
on an Amey template of a ‘Site Meeting with NIEA’. NIEA were represented by M
Gormley and E Logue, while Amey had D Hurl. The meeting took place on site at
Drumclay. The minute explains that Gormley had recently taken over NIEA
responsibility from Foley, and was brought up to speed on the development on
site by Hurl. Hurl and Gormley visited the 3 x 3m test trench. Hurl noted that
the current water level was about 600mm below the surface of the crannog and
that any excavation below that level resulted in flooding. He also noted that
root activity had impeded the excavation. Hurl ‘explained that the only
occupation feature encountered was a crude hearth in the NE corner’ and that
‘significant quantities of Late Medieval pottery (Everted Rim and Crannog
wares), a wooden board and two flint flakes, [along] with butchered and burnt
animal bone’ had been recovered. Below the level of the hearth, excavation had
revealed that the crannog consisted of ‘large deposits of organic material (e.g.
grasses, reeds, moss, brushwood), apparently stabilised by the insertion of
wooden posts and stakes’. It is worth noting that, at the is point, the trial
trenching would still have been underway, and no formal report would have been available.
Hurl described a preservation in situ proposal that would entail the
insertion of piles around the site using a mixture ‘of bog material with
cement’ (detailed further in the second meeting of the day, below). Gormley and
Logue raised concerns ‘that the exact location and extent of the crannog were
still uncertain’. I don’t want to quibble too much with this statement, but
they were standing on the crannog – they knew the location! … its exact extent
and definition of the edges, less so – but they did know where it was! Hurl
explained that the GPS survey he had proposed to Foley on December 13 only had
an accuracy of ±3m but that it would be possible to get a more accurate
plan of the edges using a total station. Hurl added that, given the frozen conditions
(it was the middle of winter!) they had not been able to identify the
edges through probing until recently. Even still, Hurl insists that the body of
the crannog does ‘not extend beyond the water’s edge’. Hurl is asked to present
details of the dimensions and locations of the piles and to establish a buffer
zone around the site, with the provision that the hydrological connection
between the bog and the site be maintained, to prevent the latter drying out.
They asked for the test trench to be backfilled and signalled that ‘should
their concerns be addressed by the technical solution, they would be content in
principle with the proposed methodology’, with the proviso of sign off from J
O’Keeffe (now Principal Inspector). They also ‘insisted that all intrusive
works in general, and operations withing the bog in particular, would be
supervised by an archaeologist. D. Hurl assured them that, as the licenced
archaeologist, he would be available to undertake such monitoring’. This
meeting (but not the second meeting of the day, see below) is minuted again by
Hurl (11 days later, on January 28) in Document 14. It adds detail that Gormley
had only recently taken on responsibility for Fermanagh and was not familiar
with the site history. Again, Hurl notes that the crannog ‘was directly on the
route of the road scheme’. Hurl also ‘stressed that the route was now fixed,
which meant that it had to traverse the bog, which is 10m deep’. He again notes
their concerns and their agreement in principle to the proposed piling
methodology.
(pp 73-4)
A second meeting appears to have taken place the same day.
The attendees were the same as before, but with the addition of Amey employees R
Moffett & S McKinney. Again, the minutes were prepared by D Hurl on an Amey
template of a ‘Site Meeting with NIEA’. Hurl again explains to the NIEA
representatives that a different engineering solution for dealing with the
crannog had been devised by Amey. McKinney goes on to outline a plan to seal
the crannog under layers of geotextile and hardcore and that a ‘raft’ of
consolidated material would run over it, supported on columns of similar
material’. Moffett goes on to explain that this would create a solid layer
between the crannog and the road and ensure that the archaeological remains
would not become compressed. From what I can visualise, it appears to have been
an amalgamation of options b and c, previously outlined to Foley at the meeting
on December 13. Foley had articulated her opposition to both of these options,
and this had already been acknowledged by Hurl. Gormley expressed concern at
the proximity of the suggested piles to the presumed edge of the crannog but
was reassured by Moffett that they would be kept 5m ‘from the observable extent
of the crannog’. Gormley requested detailed engineering designs be submitted
that included proposed locations of the columns. Moffett agreed to this but
noted that the contract for this work had been put out to tender and that the
successful company might well advance their own solution. Gormley acknowledged
this and indicated that an alternative proposal could be considered. Logue
inquired if the results of wood sample recovered from the test trenching and
submitted for radiocarbon dating had been received and was informed by Hurl
that they had not. Hurl also volunteered that the recovered pottery had been
submitted for analysis, but ‘that the production of such post-excavation
reports would not delay the commencement of the development’.
February 3 (pp 79-80)
Document 15 is an email from Hurl to Gormley & Logue
where he states that ‘I’ve been speaking to various engineering types in the
office’ about the proposed technical solution to avoid excavation of the
crannog. He also attaches his own schematic drawing to ‘make sense of the
details’. He reiterates the proposal to create piles from bog material and
cement, 1m in diameter and 3m apart. These will encircle the crannog, even
though he admits that its limits are not yet clearly understood. Hurl’s
illustration is enlightening. I had previously (wrongly) understood that Hurl’s
argument was that the crannog was not much thicker than the 600mm depth he had
excavated. The illustration makes it clear that he understood the crannog to be
approximately 10m thick - the same depth as the bog – but that it had near
vertical sides, falling from the supposed 15m top diameter. Even the most
passing familiarity with the classic crannog excavations at Lagore, Ballinderry
(I & II), or Moynagh Lough should have been enough to know that these sites
do not rise (or sink) majestically with vertical sides. On dry land too –
ringforts/raths, mounds, ditches … pretty much everything slumps and splays at
the base. So why not here? Other experienced archaeologists looked at this and
appear not to have raised concerns.
April 5 (p 101)
Document 17 is an email chain beginning with Hurl to
Gormley asking for a meeting to discuss the engineering solution, saying that
‘it would be useful to sort through some ideas’. McKinney & Moffett are
cc’d.
April 12 (p 100-1)
Response to previous email by Logue offering several dates
when she and Gormley are available (from April 19-21). There is a response the
same day from Hurl to say that he may be in Scotland that week on other work
but will check his availability.
April 14 (p 100)
Email from Hurl to Logue and Gormley saying that a time on
a Thursday morning would suit Amey best (i.e. April 21). Response the
same day from Logue agreeing to the day suggesting 10:30.
April 21
Minutes of meeting agreed to in Document 17 do not appear in
this PDF file. But the follow-up email in Document 17, below, indicates that
the discussion centred on the proposed engineering solution.
May 3 (p 100, 102)
Document 17 email chain ends with follow up from McKinney
to Gormley & Logue attaching a revised drawing of the proposed engineering
solution. This drawing appears to have been based on the borehole data to
provide the levels of solid natural. The base of the crannog is now shown as
having a distinct splay, though it is noted as approximate. McKinney asks if
the NIEA representatives: ‘Can you
please review and let me know if you have any comments or alternatively if this
is acceptable?’
June 27 (p 103-4)
Document 18 is a copy of a cover letter and the ‘Extension
of Licence to Excavate for Archaeological Purposes’. The letter is from K Neill
to Hurl agreeing to Hurl’s request for an extension of the original excavation
licence and the Licence notes that it is effective for the period from June 17
(10 days before the licence was issued) to December 16, 2011. The signature of
the Authorised Officer is redacted.
November nd.
Meeting between NIEA and McLaughlin & Harvey regarding
ground stabilisation solution. Minutes of this meeting are not available in the
PDF archive but are mentioned by Foley in the December 20 meeting between NIEA
& Amey. Foley noted that the construction firm were ‘slightly confused as
to who they should be speaking to in relation to this element of the works’.
See below, December 20.
December 20 (pp 107-9)
Document 19 is a set of meeting minutes prepared by
McKinney on an Amey template of a ‘NIEA Meeting’. Amey was represented by
McKinney & Hurl, while Foley & Gormley attend on behalf of NIEA. The
stated aim of the meeting is to ‘establish a potential solution that would be
acceptable to NIEA which would incorporate the crannog in-situ within the
overall road design.’ Foley ‘highlighted that to date NIEA were disappointed
that a suitable compromise had not been reached in relation to incorporating
the crannog into the final road design.’ You don’t say? … they’d only known since April 2008 that
they’d have to deal with the crannog in some manner. By this point an external
contractor had been appointed and while Amey had specified that the preferred
solution would require ground stabilisation methods (the columns of concrete
and bog material mix previously discussed with NIEA). However, the successful
contractor (McLaughlin & Harvey) had decided to use ‘piled slab’. This is
the use of a matrix of vertical concrete columns supporting a solid concrete
deck of ‘slab’. Gormley says that the contractor had proposed inserting 24
concrete piles through the crannog to support the ‘piled slab’. Unsurprisingly,
she thought this was unacceptable and would damage the archaeology. McKinney’s
response was based solely on cost implications. Piling around the crannog
rather than across it would cost and additional £1m to £3m ‘and this is
obviously not feasible for a scheme of this size’. McKinney goes on to suggest
‘a compromise of using less [sic.] piles within the crannog area though
of greater diameter’. NIEA were clearly broken by the suggested cost
implications and the minute notes that ‘NIEA stated that considering the cost
implications discussed above some sort of compromise would be acceptable’.
Gormley added that if the contractor used an augur pile ‘they would be
interested in assessing the arising’s from each pile for archaeological
purposes’. Gormley stated that she was content to use fewer, but larger, piles
across the site and would review a formal submission on the matter.
2012
January 13 (pp 105-6)
Document 18 (continues) is copy of a cover letter and the
‘Extension of Licence to Excavate for Archaeological Purposes’. The letter is
from Gormley to Hurl agreeing to Hurl's request for an extension of the original
excavation licence and the Licence notes that it is effective for the period
from December 17, 2011 (27 days before the licence was issued) to June 16,
2012. The signature of the Authorised Officer is redacted.
January 30
Cooney’s report notes that by this date Amey were telling
NIEA that the contractor (MHPT JV) ‘was not properly considering how to deal
with the crannog. MHPT JV were considering digging out the bog as an
engineering solution, including the crannog area.’
February 23 (pp 121-33)
Latest sign-off on topsoil monitoring report by Hurl
(Document 21). Not of relevance to the crannog.
February 24 (pp 110-20)
Latest sign-off on crannog Trenching Report by Hurl
(Document 20). Trenching work carried out on the crannog is only identified as
happening in the month of February. The report details the results of machine
cut trenches on and around the crannog at the behest of NIEA ‘to assist in
determining its extent’. The radiocarbon date noted previously had been
returned and is given as broadly ‘Late Medieval (14th century)’. In
Trenches C, D, & E Hurl notes that ‘Although flooded, a tactile
investigation was carried out’ which I interpret as meaning that someone put
their hand into the water and had a feel about. I further interpret this to
mean that no one thought to have the trenches pumped – a tracked digger could
be brought onto site, but not a pump? No in situ artefacts or worked
wood were noted from withing these trenches. However, examination of the
spoilheaps allowed the recovery of ‘the ends of toolmarked timbers ranging from
10-100mm in diameter, … wooden offcuts and shavings, a few animal bones and
several scorched stones.’ The most important line in the Conclusion is that
‘The findings within the trenches coincided with the survey of the estimated
outline of the crannog’ – quite a statement based on flooded, unpumped trenches
that were excavated to a maximum of 1.1m.
February 28
Cooney’s report notes an NIEA response to the Trenching
report stating that ‘the trenches dug with a machine had not been excavated
archaeologically, that Declan Hurl did not direct the work (as licensed), nor
was he even present. The work carried out was unauthorised and in contravention
of the Historic Monuments and Archaeological Objects (NI) Order 1995.’
It is also worth reminding ourselves at this point that
Cooney made the following judgment on the NIEA reaction to the knowledge that
the trenching had not been carried out under archaeological supervision: ‘It is
very difficult to understand why NIEA: Built Heritage did not act more strongly
when the ‘Crannog Trenching Report’ was submitted under the excavation license
(AE/10/199) issued to Declan Hurl in February 2012. The work carried out was
unauthorised and in direct contravention of Article 41 of the Historic
Monuments and Archaeological Objects (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, caused
damage to the site and could have constituted a prosecutable offence. Amey’s
admission of breach of license was, as stated by NIEA officials, admission of
an illegal act (parallel to a breach of listed building consent). Yet there is
no file reference to further action – such as referral to senior management for
advice in relation to this breach, consideration of referral to Departmental
Solicitors, or revocation of the license to excavate. NIEA: Built Heritage took
no further action and indeed renewed the license so that Declan Hurl could
undertake excavation of the site in June 2012’
However, Moffett when he spoke with me was eager to explain
the situation away as a communication issue – the Amey site manager not
realising that work on an archaeological site should be supervised by an
archaeologist and that it was Hurl who alerted NIEA to the facts: ‘Once it was discovered that a mistake had
been made and, in fairness to Declan [Hurl], he highlighted it with the NIEA
senior officer … the NIEA senior officer, as I understand it, changed then
completely – there was one person on it and then the second person came in. The
second person raised it in discussion with Declan. Declan highlighted that in
his view it was illegal, and between them there was an agreement made that,
essentially, a trenching report would be completed to salvage the exercise.’
February 29
Cooney’s report notes: ‘At a site meeting on the 29
February Amey agreed that the trenches had been dug without archaeological
supervision. The Amey archaeologist had pointed out the illegality of the
action but had not said this in the report which he had written for Amey to
submit to NIEA’
March 6 (p 134)
Document 22 is an email from D McKinley (Roads Service) to
P Doherty (Roads Service) with a subject line ‘Cherrymount Suspected Crannog’.
McKinley advises that J Knight (Amey) is meeting NIEA representatives on site
on Thursday (presumably March 8). NIEA have specified that E Haliday (Amey’s
Geotechnical Engineer) be present ‘probably to ascertain of the contractor
earthworks proposal is achievable and what effect it may have on the crannog’.
McKinley goes on to say that he thinks ‘that NIEA’s disgruntlement stems from
their request for a trench to be dug by the excavator across the site and for
an archaeologist to examine the arisings. Unfortunately our PM arranged for
this but an archaeologist was not present during excavation. NIEA staff
visiting the site have “interviewed” Amey staff and seem to taken [sic.]
a strict official line on the matter.’ As noted previously, this unsupervised
trenching is mentioned in Cooney’s report. It also casts an interesting light
on the February 24 Trenching Report that does not provide any of this detail
and through its omission implies that the archaeologist was on site throughout.
In this context, the fact that the only photographs are of flooded trenches and
that worked wood, etc., is largely recovered from the spoil heap, along with
the need for ‘tactile investigation’, is much more apparent. McKinley goes on
to suggest that the crannog be ‘surrounded by rock fill … [and] dewatered to
give NIEA a once in a lifetime opportunity to investigate/resolve such an
archaeological feature’. Before anyone rejoices that McKinley is suggesting
that a full, scientific excavation is conducted on the crannog, he goes on to
state that ‘it may be a “course” [sic.] resolution with arising being
set aside by excavator for more detailed examination but any artefacts could be
retrieved just as with hydraulic dredging of sea channels when the “arising” [sic.]
are inspected on a conveyor belt by archaeologist [sic.].’ So … yeah …
the plan now is to machine through the entire crannog and pick out what
artefacts you can grab … no stratigraphy, no recording of structures … no
environmental evidence … just machine it all away! That’s some ‘once in a
lifetime opportunity’! He now states that ‘my recollection is that the locus of
the crannog was unknown and NIEA didn’t raise a “thou shalt not go there”
objection.’ This argument was raised at various times during the ensuing
controversy and, even beyond Cooney’s report we can see that the warnings were
being given from at least April 2008 that the road would directly impact the
crannog. Road Service’s own February 2009 Notice of Intention to Proceed
explicitly states ‘The proposed Cherrymount Link Road will directly impact on
two archaeological sites, a crannog and a dug-out canoe’ (Section 3.12.5).’ While
NIEA did not dictate that the road layout be changed to avoid the site, they
were explicit in their repeated requests for a viable mitigation plan and by,
at least, December 2010 Amey’s in-house archaeologist (Hurl) was outlining
possibilities (including full excavation). In the next paragraph McKinley
(presumably noting the July 25, 2006, letter from B Williams) states that ‘EHS
in consultation confirmed that they did not know the exact location, didn’t
have resource to put to it and place responsibility for doing so with the
developer’ … you mean, like every other developer? That whole legal requirement
placed on every company undertaking development that might impact
archaeological remains … it wasn’t something dreamt up by NIEA to merely
confound Roads Service! McKinley notes the laying down of the hardcore trackway
to the site, the sinking of boreholes, and the January 2011 test trenching,
adding that ‘it wasn’t confirmed if the area was a crannog’. I’m genuinely
stunned by this statement. I will merely note that although there were many
meetings and communications between various NIEA officials, numerous Amey
employees, and most especially their in-house archaeologist, Hurl, – many of
them clearly difficult and with strongly opposing viewpoints – never … not even
once … in the documentation available to me did anyone disagree with or quibble
over the term ‘crannog’. Questions clearly remained over the exact extent of
the edges, but that there was a crannog in that location was not in doubt. In
the final paragraph McKinley notes NIEA’s reluctance to consider the ‘piled
slab’ option discussed from December 20, 2011, but that ‘I believe were
prepared to consider it.’ It’s worth noting that he describes the insertion of
24 concrete piles through the crannog as ‘a few discrete piles within the area
of interest’, forcing the definition of ‘a few’ to do some serious heavy
lifting. He concludes with the observation that ‘The present proposal to
excavate and replace is a better option for RS … unfortunately NIEA may not
align to this and see it as a threat as opposed to an opportunity.’ I may not
always be NIEA’s biggest cheerleader, but I can’t foresee a day that they would
welcome a scrabble to recover artefacts machined out of a site as ‘an
opportunity’.
March 8 (p 134)
Presumed date of meeting between NIEA and Amey
representatives (including E Haliday, Amey’s Geotechnical Engineer), based on D
McKinley’s email of March 6 (Document 22). No minutes of this supposed meeting
are available in the PDF archive.
April 17 (pp 135-45)
The Crannog Slippage Report by Hurl (Document 23) details
how ‘trenching at Cherrymount had resulted in a lowering of the water level of
the bog to the extent that cracks had appeared in the crannog, resulting in
partial collapse of the NW of the structure’. The sign off date for the report
is April 20. It appears that unmonitored trenching had taken place in the bog
and had come within 20m of the crannog. This led to a drop in water level and
‘the level of the solid bog material had visibly dropped by c. 1.5m, leaving
the crannog noticeably elevated in relation to the bog.’ This lead to cracking
‘throughout the N portion of the crannog.’ In an effort to prevent further
cracking, machines were brought in to install rock ‘bunding’ to the west of the
crannog. The slippage and cracking did allow for the observation that the
crannog was larger at the base than previously thought, if only by c. 1m.
Various vertical and horizontal timbers were identified within the body of the
crannog, but ‘Further examination was curtailed due to further ground
movement.’ Hurl’s interpretation includes the line that ‘The fact that the
crannog maintained its full height despite the drop in the level of the bog
would suggest that it is a solid structure, i.e. it continues substantively
down to and sits on the subsoil/bedrock at the base of the bog’. The litany of
failures that led to a substantial portion of the crannog just slipping away is
described by Hurl in his Conclusions as ‘The current predicament’. While it’s
not of the order of Patrick Kavanagh dismissing the entirety of WWII as ‘the
Munich bother’, it remains a masterpiece of understatement. He agrees that ‘the
decision to replace bog material with rock along the W side of the crannog
appears to be the only recourse available to stabilise the monument and to
prevent further slippage.’ I would never want to be seen as a person who would
discourage or diminish a positive attitude, but stating that ‘It is testimony
to the robust nature of the monument that so much of it remains relatively
intact’ even a decade after the event, leaves me breathless with wonder. It
essentially states that this emerging, unchecked omnishambles that led to the
partial collapse of an archaeological monument was actually a good thing! Now
we know how strong it is! Of course, the reason this point is made is to
prepare the reader for the final paragraph of the Conclusions: ‘In light of the
strength of the crannog and the proposed methodology for alleviating the
pressure of the road through the use of stone-filled membrane cells is likely
to result in successful preservation of the monument once the area has been
stabilised.’ I am not a person for whom the written word usually fails, but I
do genuinely struggle to articulate a response to this level of stone-cold
mendacity. There is no acceptance of blame, no apparent understanding that anyone
has been derelict in their duty at any level. These things just happened
passively, and certainly without anyone who could be held responsible. As
though this were not enough, these events are spun to make them seem as though
they were positive developments. Had he read this, Peter Mandelson himself
would be moved to drop to his knees, begging to study at the feet of an
acknowledged master.
(pp 146-7)
Document 24 is an email chain that covers the period from
April 17 to 23. It begins with an email from E Halliday (Amey) to Gormley
(NIEA). He relates how he visited the crannog following a call from McKinley.
He relates how the contractor was working some 20 – 30m from the crannog and
(as detailed in Hurl’s report, above) were responsible for the damage to the
crannog. McKinley (Roads Service) requests an urgent site meeting ‘to ensure
that works in this area are carried out to the satisfaction of all parties.’ He
notes that he has left a voicemail message and asks het to call him and notes
that he can liaise with both Amey and Roads Service to get the meeting
organised. A number of people are cc’d to the email, but it excludes Hurl.
April 18 (p 146)
Email from McKinley to Halliday and Gormley. He reiterates
that the contractor has been instructed to cease work on the north side of the
crannog, they will continue along the western side before turning south. This
way they will surround the crannog and be able to install ‘a rock bunding’ to
stabilise the crannog (even if there is no bog remaining to maintain a
hydrological link to anymore). Again, Hurl is not cc’d on the correspondence.
April 20 (p 146)
Reply from Gormley apologising for taking three days to
respond to the news that cracks have opened up in the crannog and a portion of
the north side has slipped off. Apparently, an internal auditor’s inspection
took precedence. She states that she has read Hurl’s report and had ‘a brief
discussion with him’, though she reveals neither the contents nor the tone of
that discussion. She notes that the earliest she is available to meet with them
is the following Wednesday (April 25), eight days after the partial collapse.
Hurl is added to the cc list of this email.
April 23 (p 146)
The final email in the chain is from Keenan to Knight
indicating that the latter should be available on April 25 and asking if he can
have access to a copy of Hurl’s Crannog Slippage Report.
April 25 (pp 148-50)
Document 25 is a set of meeting minutes prepared by
McKinney on an Amey template & titled ‘NIEA Meeting’. In attendance is
Gormley for NIEA; McKinley & Keenan for Roads Service; Moffett, Hurl,
Knight, & McKinney of Amey; Halliday for Central Procurement Directorate;
and M McWilliams of PT McWilliams, the contractor. This ratio of 1:8 is exactly
what Cooney means when he talks about the asymmetry of several meetings where
one member of NIEA is pitted against a multitude of opposing voices. It’s not
like these are just ‘room meat’, brought along to bulk out the attendance and
look intimidating – some of these are the top people in each of their
respective organisations, and against them is a relatively junior case officer
from the NIEA. Where were their senior people and who thought it was a wise
decision to send a lone representative into that situation? Into the meeting proper, it is immediately
noted that the ‘recent excavations … had a detrimental effect on adjacent
land’, lowering the ground level by c 2m in the vicinity of the crannog,
leading to slippage and cracking across the site. S McKinney noted that as the
crannog ‘had remained in place … it was therefore a very substantial structure
founded at a deep level’. D McKinley asked Gormley if, considering all the
damage done to the site, any of the original options are still applicable.
Gormley outlines two options – either 1) incorporate the crannog into the road,
as previously discussed, or 2) ‘dig out a section of the Crannog under
archaeological supervision, this being the lesser preferred option.’ Hurl argued
that if the second option was the preferred way forward, it would be ‘a good
opportunity to investigate how the crannog had been constructed and identify
what materials have been used within the various layers during its
construction.’ Gormley asked for reassurance that, should they go with
incorporating the crannog into the road, that the site ‘would not be subjected
to overburden pressure and subsequent consolidation.’ Although this has been
previously discussed as a feasible option, D McKinley admitted that he ‘could
not envisage how a geogrid/geocell solution could prevent additional overburden
pressure being imposed on the underlying structure.’ At this point the ‘piled
slab’ option must have reared its head as the minutes record that Gormley was
opposed to piling through the site under Option 1, but would consider it as
part of Option 2. With the clarification ‘subject to the habitation layers and
part of the construction layers being satisfactorily excavated and recorded.
Similarly, she was receptive to permitting overburden pressure being applied to
any remaining construction layers under Option 2.’ At no point did any of the
archaeologists involved here (Gormley & Hurl) suggest seeking the advice of
a specialist in wetlands excavation. Instead, they appear to have overestimated
their ability or knowledge in this sphere, relying on their own insufficient
experience. Hurl put forward the estimate that an excavation of ‘the habitation
layers’ would require 10-12 archaeologists for up to two months. And here we
see a switch-around with non-archaeologists dictating what is and is not
acceptable. D McKinley believes it may be acceptable if they can start as soon
as possible ‘and that it did not have serious implications to the overall
construction programme for the scheme.’ McWilliams agreed to surround the site
with a rock bund to prevent further slippage, but ‘was concerned that should
the resolution of the crannog extend beyond 4 weeks it would have an
unacceptable impact on his programme.’ These are the people who caused the issue
laying down what they thought was acceptable. Why was there no apparent push
back to enforce the existing legislation? Why was there no suggestion that a
competent, experienced wetland archaeologist be sought out to provide an
opinion? So many questions! It is worth remembering Cooney’s verdict on the
manner and impact of installing this rock bund: ‘… instead of the preventive
measure of a rock bund being placed to the west of the crannog to protect it,
this work appears to have destroyed archaeological deposits around the entire
perimeter, particularly on the western part of the crannog where a substantial
part of the site was removed’.
May 31 (pp 151-162)
Document 26 is the ‘Crannog Excavation Methodology’
developed by Hurl. The latest sign-off date is May 31, 36 days after the April
25 meeting where an imminent start to the archaeological excavation was thought
to be so important. The document purports to outline a methodology ‘to excavate
the occupation layers of the crannog, permitting the insertion of piles through
the ‘construction phase’ body of the monument.’ The proposal is to excavate the
crannog through four quadrants on the southern portion of the site, with the
northern areas investigated only if deemed safe. Crucially (and completely
wrongly), Hurl argues that ‘From previous excavations and the survey mentioned
in 2.5, it is estimated that the depth of relevant stratigraphy would vary
across the site from 0.5m in the centre of the crannog to 1.0-1.5m at the edges
where most post-construction compaction and slippage would have occurred and
where refuse, especially from fires, would have been deposited.’ Hurl has revised
his earlier estimate and now states that, unexpected archaeological discoveries
aside, this should take four to six weeks. One interesting detail is that the
‘excavation works associated with the construction of the Cherrymount Link’ are
now described in the following manner: ‘This, may or may not have contributed
to the formation of cracks which appeared in the crannog.’, but see the July 3
email for further detail.
June 11 (pp 164-5)
Document 27 comprises a letter and email chain beginning
with the letter from Moffett to J McClean (Roads Service) outlining the tenders
by four archaeological consultancies (rates redacted) ‘to complete a full
archaeological excavation of the habitable layer (which extends to
approximately 1.5 metres deep). On completion of this work, this feature would
subsequently be incorporated within the road foundation.’ Moffett notes that
‘Farrimond MacManus – a company who has previously undertaken archaeological
works for Amey provided the lowest tender for this work.’ And seeks approval to
appoint them to the contract.
June 14 (p 163)
An email from Moffett forwarding the June 11 letter to S Keenan.
He notes that ‘costs quoted include expense hence the 4 week calculate should
represent the worst case in terms of site works.’ [sic.]
June 18 (p 163)
Email from S Keenan forwarding previous email and letter to
D McKinley ‘for info.’.
June 29 (p 207-8)
Document 29 is a brief email chain of two messages, both
from J O’Keeffe to J White. At this date O’Keeffe begins with the statement
that ‘you may recall that I mentioned this site during our meeting earlier this
year.’ (Minutes of this meeting are not preserved in the current archive). He
goes on: ‘At that time I noted that we were concerned about the potential
impact of the scheme on the archaeology of the site. … from an archaeological
point of view this appears to be a very rich site, with a lot of surviving
material.’ He then goes on to list four NIEA representatives who - at one time
or another - had been involved in the case (a point flagged by Cooney, noting
the lack of continuity in NIEA’s approach). He mentions a meeting between
Foley, Gormley and Hurl ‘this week’, and that O’Keeffe had spoken with Hurl
that day. He mentions that both the Impartial Reporter newspaper and a
‘local resident expressed concern about the works on site, and believed the
excavation was to finish next Friday and the site would be destroyed.’ The
reason for this communication at this time is ‘so that you are aware of the
site, and also to ensure that NIEA and Roads Service can address any issues at
an early stage directly with one another.’ I’ve got to respect the sentiment,
but this is June 2012 … the correspondence goes back to 2006, and by this point
there have been several test trenches dug, various discussions about piling
through the site, the excavation works in the area have led to cracks across
the crannog and part of the northern portion of the site collapsing, never to
be seen again … and O’Keeffe thinks it’s all at ‘an early stage’? The situation
is genuinely beyond parody. He notes that Gormley, Foley, & K Neill all
intend to visit the site (holidays permitting) and that P Logue will visit
‘next week’. He intends to visit the crannog on July 10 ‘(weather and minister
permitting), to get a better understanding of the archaeology, the progress of
the scheme, and the potential impacts this might have on the development
schedule.’ In a conciliatory tone O’Keeffe posits the idea that ‘there is a
very positive publicity opportunity for Roads Service in highlighting the work
that is ongoing, and I think that we need to consider how best to move the
project forward.’ On top of this, NIEA are also reviewing the mitigation to see
ways where NIEA and Roads Service ‘could partner the mitigation (particularly
in respect of taking environmental samples from the site).’ He promises that
following the planned visits by Logue and himself, he’ll ‘get back to you as
soon as possible, particularly if there are any issues that need to be
highlighted and resolved at this stage.’ O’Keeffe ends with the line: ‘I want
to ensure that any comments or requirements about the archaeological mitigation
of the site are communicated directly between NIEA and Roads Service, at an
early stage to avoid any confusion.’ I read this email as a somewhat desperate
and belated attempt by O’Keeffe to recentre communication away from Amey and
onto Roads Service, the ultimate client of the project. White’s response, if
any, is not available in this archive.
July 3 (pp 166-206)
Document 28 is a letter from J Simpson (on behalf of Amey)
to C McManus, addressing her as ‘Dear Sir’. The letter is accompanied by Amey’s
Professional Services Order for ‘the provision of excavation crew.’ Hurl’s
Crannog Excavation Methodology is included as Appendix 2: The Professional
Services to be Provided. For whatever reason, this copy is signed off as ‘Xth
May 2012’, unlike the previous which is signed off on 30th and 31th
[sic.] May 2012. It would appear that this is an earlier draft with
tracked changes applied to Hurl’s first submission. Of particular note is the
evidence that the highlighted portions of the phrase ‘This, may or may not
have contributed to the formation of cracks which appeared in the
crannog.’ were a later addition and not present in Hurl’s first draft.
July 5
One concerned member of staff makes representations to
NIEA, but received no response.
July 10 (pp 207-8)
Proposed date for O’Keeffe to visit the crannog as
mentioned in Document 29. This visit does not appear to have taken place.
July 17
One concerned member of staff makes representations to NIEA
but received no response.
O’Keeffe instructs Gormley to remain permanently on site to,
as Cooney, relates ‘provide a full assessment of the conduct of the excavation.’
Publication of blog post ‘Urgent! Important Early Christian
Crannog in Fermanagh in danger of destruction - help needed!’ [here]
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